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Posting privacy policies has become a popular practice 
with businesses as they seek to shield themselves from 
potential liability or regulation, as well as inform users 
about their privacy and rights. These policies are in many 
ways modeled after software license statements, and are 
often more legalistic than user friendly. This paper 
examines the current practice of privacy policies as fair 
warning hold up from a usability perspective, and what 
steps can be taken to ensure that the average user can 
protect their privacy online.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Posting privacy policies has become a popular practice 
with businesses as they seek to shield themselves from 
potential liability or regulation, as well as inform users 
about their privacy and rights. An estimated 73% of 
websites now include a privacy policy [AEL02]. These 
policies are in many ways modeled after software license 
statements, and are often more legalistic than user friendly. 
How well do these policies meet the needs of users, and 
how can they be improved? 
In a 2001 survey, 69% of respondents said they agreed 
with the following statement: “I am concerned about 
privacy invasions [online] and try to take action to prevent 
them from happening to me” [CM01]. Is there really cause 
for concern? Well, according to [AEL02], (91%) of U.S. 
Web sites collect personal information and 90% collect 
personal identifying information. Currently, privacy 
policies are the only mechanism for communicating 
privacy practices in wide scale use. For the user, they 
represent the only source of information on which to base 
decisions about participation and privacy. Therefore, it is 
important to examine this practice and determine whether it 
fulfills its purpose 
The privacy policy builds on the ideas of fair warning and 
implicit consent.  If a company posts its policy in a public 
place, it can assume that users have been warned and by the 
act of continuing to use the service, have agreed to its 
terms. This assumption can be made regardless of whether 
users have actually read the warning or not.   
Businesses find this practice compelling because it requires 
very little effort or expense on their side. A policy must be 
posted and made publicly available, from there on the user 
is made solely responsibility for their own protection. Sites 
typically do not gain informed consent, but rather assume it 
from all visitors. 
The practice of fair warning rests on three pillars [USC99]: 
• Warning should be readily available to affected 
parties  
• Affected parties should be given a clear way to 
voice their concerns or questions; and 
• Warning should be understandable to any 
reasonable person making a good faith effort. 
When it comes to the issue of availability, most websites 
featuring a privacy policy provide (at least) a link to it from 
their main page. Though not always prominently featured, 
sites which do have a privacy policy usually make it 
available to users, at least those users who know to look for 
it. This is an important issue: A privacy policy may not be 
sought out or consulted unless a user suspects information 
about them is being collected. It is unlikely that users know 
91% of all US sites collect information on them [AEL02].  
In general, the second principle is fulfilled since most sites 
provide at the minimum an email address for the 
webmaster. Whether this person is qualified to, or willing 
to answer questions about the privacy policy is debatable. 
But does this really matter? After all, online policies are 
non-negotiable. The user is presented with a set of terms 
and conditions, and has no leverage, or voice to negotiate 
new terms. While in some cases this may be an artifact of 
technical contraints, most often this is not the case.  
We are increasingly becoming a nation of Internet users. 
According to a recent survey, 53.9% of the US population 
is now online [NTIA02]. As more of us go online, the 
diversity seen in our nation is also reflected online. Gone 
are the days when the Internet was the exclusive domain of 
researchers and univerisites. Now the Internet is used by 
people from all walks of life. For this reason, the third 
principle on which privacy policies are built needs to be 
carefully examined. We need to make sure that we are not 
creating a “digital literacy divide”, that we are not failing 
vulnerable populations by allowing them to be exploited. 
For this reason we examine the state of literacy online, and 
whether privacy policies live up to the standard of being 




The fair warning principle rests on the condition that 
“warning should be understandable to any reasonable 
person making a good faith effort”. To investigate whether 
privacy policies live up to this requirement, we have 
analyzed the writing of 22 privacy policies. In order to do 
so objectively and in a manner which would allow for 
further analysis, we used a standardized readability 
measure.    
There are a number of common methods to analyze 
readability currently in use. The most popular are 
summarized below: 
Dale-Chall 
A vocabulary-based formula normally used to assess 
upper elementary through secondary materials.  
Flesch Reading Ease  
Normally used to assess adult materials, shows scores 
on a scale between 0 and 100.  
Flesch Grade Level 
Most reliable when used with upper elementary and 
secondary materials.  
Fry Graph 
Used over a wide grade range of materials, from 
elementary through college and beyond. 
FOG  
Widely used in the health care and general insurance 
industries for general business publications.  
Powers-Sumner- Kear 
Used in assessing primary through early elementary 
level materials.  
SMOG  
Unlike any of the other formulas, SMOG predicts the 
grade level required for 100% comprehension.  
FORCAST  
Focuses on functional literacy. Used to assess non- 
running narrative, e.g. questionnaires, forms, tests. 
Spache  
A vocabulary-based formula widely used in assessing 
primary through fourth grade materials. 
For more information see [Tef87].  
Each of these methods have their own strengths and 
weaknesses, are based on different theoretical foundations, 
and have their own set of vocal proponents. Though the 
FOG index is widely used in the evaluation of documents 
in heathcare and insurance fields, we chose to use the 
Flesch index instead. Our choice was largely influenced by 
two factors: The need to classify the readability of 
documents into the educational grade level required of their 
readers, and the desire to compare our findings to previous 
studies [Hoc01, NTIA02, USA01].  
Flesch Reading Ease Calculation 
The Flesch formulas work well with upper elementary and 
secondary texts. The Flesch Reading Ease Score is 
calculated as follows [Fle49]:  
206.835 - 84.6 * (total syllables/ total words) –  
1.015 * (total words/total sentences) 
The Flesch Grade Level is calculated as follows [Fle49]:  
(0.39 * Average sentence length (in words)) +  
(11.8 * Average number of syllables per word) - 15.59  
Table 1 gives an overview of how the Flesch Reading Ease 
Score relates to the Flesch Grade Level [Fle49]. 
Table 1: Flesch Grade Level 
Flesch Score Text Difficulty Flesch Grade Level 
0-29 Very Difficult College Graduate 
30-49 Difficult College 
50-59 Fairly Difficult 10th-12th (High School) 
60-69 Standard 8th to 9th Grade 
70-79 Fairly Easy 7th Grade 
80-89 Easy 6th Grade 
90-100 Very Easy 5th Grade 
Flesch Reading Ease Score and its relationship to the the 
Flesch grade level and complexity of texts  
 
METHODOLOGY 
To make this study as balanced as possible, we studied a 
set of medical, or healthcare related websites. Healtcare is 
an area where privacy is becoming more stringently 
regulated. The professional practices common to healthcare 
providers also leads them to go to great efforts to protect 
the confidentiality of their clients and patients. We 
therefore expect healthcare to yield more thorough privacy 
policies than what a random selection would.  
To further aid our analysis we chose to look at the set of 23 
sites examined in [AER02], a study which examined the 
goals of each of these policies (for a list of sites, see table 
3). This goal analysis was deemed important to our study, 
as it could provide a way of normalizing policies in terms 
of their scope. One of these 23 sites, (WebRX) had to be 
excluded from our study because the policy was not 
available, leaving us with 22 policies.  We examined the 
same version of the policies as in [AER02] in order to 
ensure the goal analysis was applicable to our analysis. 
In this context, goals represent the abstract points that the 
policy maker wants to communicate to the user. Goals 
represent an objective and quantifiable unit of 
measurement for the content of these privacy policies. Two 
policies may express the exact same set of goals, but 
written in two very different styles. When doing a content 
analysis of the policies, this index of goals allows us to 
normalize based on the ammount of communication 
attempted in the policy.  
A number of tools calculate the Flesch readability score 
automatically, including Microsoft Word1, which we used 
to evaluate the policies. Microsoft Word also performs the 
calculations for the Flesch grade level, but caps the grade 
level at 12th grade. We were therefore unable to use 
Microsoft Word to evaluate the grade level and instead 
calculated these scores manually.  
To evaluate the readability of online policies, we have to 
make assumptions about the reading abilities of Internet 
users. Given that the sites we studied provide services and 
information to US residents, our assumptions reflect the 
literacy of the adult US population. We restrict our analysis 
to adult readers (25 years or older). Almost all members of 
this reading population have completed their formal 
education, which means that the literacy requirements of 
policies and the literacy of the reading population can be 
fairly compared., An additional reason to exclude younger 
readers is that minors are protected under special 
legislation [FTC99] When we refer to the Internet 
population througout this paper, we refer to Internet users  




The 1992 National Adult Literacy Survey [NALS93] set 
the average reading ability for the adult population (adults 
over the age of 25) between  8th and 9th grade. 19.6% of the 
US population over the age of 25 have less than a high 
school education, and only 24.4% of the population have a 
bachelors degree or higher [USC02]. It is clear that there is 
a literacy divide in America today, but does this extend into 
the Internet? Literacy and education are closely linked to 
income and, as computers and Internet access are not 
universally available, we expected the Internet population 
to have a higher than average literacy rate.  
How big is the online literacy divide? How diverse is the 
Internet population when it comes to education? Until the 
late 90’s, the Internet was predominantly used by well 
educated men. In 1994, the Second GVU WWW User 
Survey [GVU94] found that 70% of respondents had a 
college education or higher, and an additional 19% had 
some college education/were still in college. Furthermore, 
90% of respondents were male. Since then, Internet use has 
                                                          
1 http://www.microsoft.com/office/word/ 
grown almost exponentially. In a 2002 survey, the National 
Telecomunications and Information Administration (NTIA) 
determined that 53.9% of the US population is now online, 
and that gender differences have largely disappeared  
[NTIA02]. 
The NTIA survey [NTIA02] did look at how education 
affected Internet use, looking at what percentage of adults 
in each educational category (less than high school, high 
school diploma, some college, bachelors degree, or beyond 
bachelors) use the Internet. When combined with 
information from the 2000 US Census [USC02] on the 
number of adults in each of these categories we find what 
percentage of the online population these groups constitute 
(Table 2). 









Less Than High 
School 35,715,625 19.6% 17.0% 6,071,656 6.2% 
High School  
Diploma / GED 52,168,981 28.6% 47.3% 24,675,928 25.1% 
Some College / 
Associate Deg 49,864,428 27.3% 69.5% 34,655,777 35.3% 
Bachelors 
Degree 28,317,792 15.5% 84.9% 24,041,805 24.5% 
Beyond 
Bachelors # 10,088,500 5.5% 86.9% 8,766,907 8.9% 
*2000 US Census [USC02] +2002 NTIA report [NTIA02] 
#US Census reports graduate studies together with 
technical degrees. This later category was removed to 
match the classification in the NTIA survey. 
As we expected, education still has an effect on Internet 
use. Our analysis shows that the average education of the 
adult US Internet population is 14th grade2, higher than 
high school, but not as high as a bachelors degree. This 
means that the Internet population, on the whole, is more 
literate and better educated than the general population. As 
the Internet population continues to grow, this average will 
continue to drop to more closely match that of general 
population. 
We find that the US Internet population divides into three 
categories of roughly equal size; those with a high school 
education or less, those with some college education, and 
those with a bachelors degree or higher. This means that 
though the Internet population is currently better educated 
and more literate then the general populus, there is a 
sizable group which is vulnerable in Internet transactions 
requiring advanced literacy skills. 
                                                          
2 Average calculated with following values: All with less 
than high school education = 11th grade, high school = 
12th grade, some college =14th grade, college = 16th grade, 
postgraduate = 17th grade. 
Policy Readability 
Our survey of 22 privacy policies found the average Flesch 
Reading Ease Score to be 36.9 (SD=5.1), and the average 
grade level required to read these policies is 13.7 (SD=1.2). 
For individual scores and reading levels, refer to Table 3.  



































AETNA 39.4 14.2 806 10 5 N
AFLAC 30.4 14.7 1930 2 1 N
BCBS 40.2 15.2 638 20 7 N
CIGNA 45.2 10.7 875 11 5 N
EHealthInsurance 23.1 15.8 1546 15 8 Y









OnlineHealthPlan 31.9 14.2 1390 17 9 Y
CornerDrugstore 37.6 13.5 1906 24 9 Y
DestinationRX 38.7 13.4 1925 34 18 Y
Drugstore 38.7 13.8 1499 29 14 Y
Eckerd 35.5 14.1 1340 15 6 N
HealthAllies 34.5 14.4 1025 17 6 Y
HealthCentral 41.1 13.1 1283 25 12 N
IVillage 28.9 16.3 3382 39 18 N









PrescriptionsByMail 39.9 12.9 1082 18 7 Y
Bayer 40.9 13.1 760 17 9 N
Glaxo Wellcome 39.5 12.6 448 12 7 N
Lilly (Eli) 40.4 13.6 507 7 5 N
Novartis (Ciba) 39.7 13.5 1340 23 5 N








Pharmacia  38.7 13.3 957 18 8 N
 Average 36.9 13.7 1203.4 17.2 7.6 31.8%
* Goals and vulnerabilities taken from [AE03]. All policies 
dated summer 2000.  Seals are from a number of different 
organizations, including TRUSTe, BBBOnline and 
WebTrust. 
On average, these policies require a reading skill equivalent 
to some college education. This average is somewhat lower 
than the average literacy level of the Internet population. 
Examining the individual policies we see that only one 
policy (that of CIGNA) scored lower than a highschool 
education (10.7). All other policies required more than a 
high school education (though Pfizer not by much). 
Acording to our analysis of the current Internet 
demographics, we find that 31.3% of the adults over 25 
currently online only possess the skills to read and 
understand one of the 22 policies examined. Two of the 
policies we examined (iVillage and eHealthInsurance) 
effectively required the equivalent of a college education 
(grades 16.3 and 15.8, respectively). This means they are 
incomprehensible to 66.6%, a full two-thirds of all Internet 
users.  
Our findings are in line with those found in other surveys 
of policies in other fields [USA01, Hoc01]. In [Hoc01], 60 
financial privacy policies were examined, the average 
Flesch score of which was 34 (SD=5.8), and an average 
grade level of 15.6 (SD=1.0). In that survey, no policy 
scored lower than 13th grade, and 12 scored 17th grade or 
higher. This means that none of these policies were 
accessible to one-third of the online population, and 20% 
of the policies were only accessible to 8.9% of the 
population.  
We examined whether there was a relationship between the 
length of the policy (in words) and either the Flesch score, 
or the grade level. Neither proved to be the case, having a 
correlation coefficient of 0.505 and 0.564  respectively. 
There also were no sign of a relationship between the 
number of goals expressed in the policy (a measure for 
content in the policy), and the Flesch score or the grade 
level (correlation coefficients 0.012 and 0.058 
respectively). The written complexity of the policies we 
studied was independent of the ammount of information the 
policy conveyed. 
Impact of Privacy Seals 
The FTC encourages self-regulation when it comes to 
policies and their content [FTC98].  In light of this 
situation, privacy seal organizations, such as TRUSTe3, 
BBBonline4 and WebTrust5, have emerged, offering 
certification to sites and their policies.  These seals often do 
not address the content of the policy, but rather the fact that 
the company has a policy, that this policy addresses a 
minimum set of issues, and that the company adheres to the 
stated policy. Users often mistake these seals to mean 
something about the level of privacy protection offered, 
which is not the case [BBB01].  
In terms of readability, the presence of such a seal has no 
effect on the Flesch score, or the grade level of the policy (t 
(19) = -1.13, p=NS, and t (19) = 1.33, p=NS respectively).  
There was a marginal effect for goals (t (19) = 1.94, 
p=0.067); the policies with seals addressed more issues 
than those without. This was to be expected, as many of the 
seals require that a policy address a minimum set of 
standard issues. 
Does the fact that seals encourage policy makers to address 
more issues/goals in their policies make for better policies, 
despite the fact that it does not make for more accessible 
policies? In other words, are users right to assume that 
seals mean stronger privacy policies? [AE03] distinguishes 




between privacy protection goals and vulnerabilities as 
follows:  
“Privacy protection goals are those that relate to the five 
FIPs“ [FIP73] “and to the desired protection of consumer 
privacy rights.  Privacy vulnerabilities relate to existing 
threats to consumer privacy. In contrast to protection 
goals, vulnerability goals represent statements of fact or 
existing behavior and are often characterized by privacy 
invasions.” 
If the assumption that privacy seals lead to policies which 
better protect users’ privacy, we should see a higher ratio 
of protection goals to vulnerabilities in policies with seals. 
In fact, what we see is the opposite: On average, seal-
carrying policies have a ratio of 0.92 vulnerabilities to each 
protection goal, while non-seal sites list 1.15 vulnerabilities 
to each protection goal (though this difference is not 
statistically significant (t(19)=-1.42, p=NS). Though seals 
may encourage more complete policies, they do not 
necessarily mean better protection for the user. 
Policy Use 
The readability of policies, and their content, only really 
matter if people try to access and read them. Whether 
policies are actually read by anyone is not something about 
which there is much data. In commercial circles, 
information on page-hits and user numbers are often 
guarded as trade secrets. We therefore have to rely largely 
on subjective user reports of what they do. Unfortunately, 
as is commonly the case with surveys, making comparisons 
between the different surveys is difficult, as wording can 
strongly  influence responses, and definitions of the 
categories used by researchers are not always available. 
A November 2001 survey done by Harris Interactive on 
behalf of the Privacy Leadership Initiative, 2,053 users 
were asked “Specifically, how much time on average have 
you spent reading websites’ privacy policies?” 31% said 
they spent little or no time looking at policies, 33% glanced 
through, but rarely read, 33% said it depended on 
circumstances but that they sometimes read policies 
carefully, and only 3% said they read the policies carefully 
most of the time. [PLI01] 
The Culnan-Milne survey, also from November 2001, 
asked 2,468 users the following question: “How often do 
you read privacy notices posted by websites?” 17% 
reported that they never read them, 33% reported that they 
rarely read them, 31% reported that they sometimes read 
them, 13% said they frequently read them, and 5% claimed 
they always read them [CM01]. 
A third study performed by Jupiter Research March 2002 
asked 2097 users to rate the accuracy of the following 
question: “Before registering, I always read the privacy 
statement.” 11% strongly disagreed, 24% disagreed, 25% 
were neutral, 26% agreed, and 14% strongly agreed. 
[Jup02].  
As expected, only a minority of users report reading policy 
statements, and more than half of Internet users reported 
that they rarely, if ever, read policies. Exactly how many 
actually do read these policies, how often, and how closely, 
is very difficult to determine, and no hard data is available. 
However, as some indication, in a June 15th 2001 article in 
the e-commerce Times, Forrester Research analyst 
Christopher Kelley reported “less than 1 percent of the 
visitors to six major online travel sites during April [2001] 




We can  conclude that almost half of the US Internet 
population does not have the reading skills to make sense 
of the average privacy policy in our sample. If we compare 
our results to other domains we find that users come out 
even worse, only 1/3 having the skills to interpret the 
average financial privacy policy [Hoc01].  
What does this mean? At a very fundamental level, online 
privacy policies are failing to meet their purpose. They may 
provide notice, but fail to meet the requirement of being 
understandable to any reasonable person making a good 
faith effort. This indicates the presence of a significant 
digital literacy divide, at least in the context of privacy 
protection. As the Internet has reached a larger, more 
diverse audience, more and more people are left behind, 
and left vulnerable to abuses of their personal information.  
Making policies readable is of crucial importance, because 
difficult language, long and confusing policies all serve to 
trick and confuse the user. In [BLJ01] the authors 
demonstate how by refrasing the same request for 
information, wildly different responses are given. As the 
authors state: “…a study by Cyber Dialogue found that 
69% of U.S. Internet users did not know they had given 
their consent to be included on email distribution lists. 
Here’s how it’s done: Using the right combination of 
question framing and default answer, an online 
organization can almost guarantee it will get the consent of 
nearly every visitor to its site.” By manipulating these 
simple variables they were able to bring participation up 
from 48.2% to 96.3% [BLJ01].  Such tactics verge on 
being predatory, since they aim to exploit the user’s 
vulnerabilities, especially those with the weakest literacy 
skills.   
Many states have readability requirements for formal 
documents such as insurance policies; “[f]or example, 
Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky and Ohio require a minimum 
score of 40 on the Flesch Reading Ease. […] Connecticut 
and Florida require a minimum of 45 on the Flesch[…]. 
Maine requires a 50” [Hoc01]. If similar standards were 
legislated to apply to privacy policies, only six of the 22 
policies (27.3%) would meet even the loosest requirement 
that applies to insurance policies (a Flesch score of 40 or 
higher). Only one policy (4.5%) would meet the 
requirements of Connecticut and Florida, and none of the 
policies would meet the requirements of Maine.  
These requirements on insurance policy readability are 
intended to prevent fraud and ensure that policies meet a 
minimum level of fairness in information disclosure. 
Policies such as these are especially important when it 
comes to protecing vulnerable segments of the population, 
a group that is increasingly establishing a presence online.  
Undue Burden 
The surveys of how privacy policies were being read paint 
a grim picture; over half the respondants report never or 
rarely reading privacy policies. Certainly, it is to be 
expected that the readability issue would discourage user 
involvement, but is this the only factor? If we look back at 
the surveys examining how actively policies were used, the 
top two reasons given for not reviewing them are that they 
are too time-consuming and too hard to read (PLI; 40% and  
29% of respondents respectively [PLI01].  The Culnan-
Milne report does not give ratios, but lists these reasons as 
being the most commonly given [CM01]. Jupiter; only 
31% or respondents find policies easy to read, 43% 
disagree [Jup02].)  
The time required of a user to review policies is significant. 
Even if the policies were all readable by a user, the burden 
on that user to review every policy for every time he or she 
visits a site is tremendous. Yet, this is what many sites 
require their users to do. Clauses such as the following 
from the Aetna privacy policy are typical: “Aetna Inc. may 
change this Statement from time to time without notice.”  
In our sample 10 of the 22 sites (45.5%) used statements 
like these to describe their official notification mechanism. 
In an industry which is heavily regulated and has a 
longstanding tradition of strong privacy protection, only 
seven of the 22 healthcare organizations (31.8% of the 
sites) took the burden of notification and issued warnings 
to users that their policy had changed Most commonly, 
these took the form of email notifications. Five sites 
(22.7%) did not disclose how policy changes would be 
advertised, meaning that the burden to find out is given to 
the user. All in all, 68.2% of our sites require their users to 
check the policy every time they visit the site. Failure to do 
so is automatically interpreted as a sign of acceptance of 
the new terms.  
Pitfalls of Policy Practices 
In addition to the issues addressed so far, there are other 
problems associated with privacy policies and the current 
practice.  
Implicit Consent 
The current practice for collecting consent is to assume that 
any person using the system has agreed to the terms 
specified in the privacy policy and has given their consent. 
For this to be a fair practice, policies would have to be 
accessible from clearly marked “safe” areas of the 
websites, areas not bound by the terms of the policy and 
free of data collection of any form. Without such provision, 
the simple act of consulting the policy (requiring the user to 
at least access the policy page and the site’s front page) 
means that users have already given their consent, a 
“Catch-22” situation. This practice violates the very 
essence of the concept of fair warning as well as consent.  
Focus of Policies 
The goal-based content analysis of these website privacy 
policies shows that these policies tend to focus on “the 
security of the data collection process; how and what 
information is being collected; and contain assurances that 
users are given the option to decide how personal 
information collected about them is to be used” [AE03].  
While these are undoubtedly important issues, a survey of 
users’ privacy concerns shows an important mismatch 
between these issues and what users are most concerned 
about.  “Transfer of information to others, such as third 
parties; about being notified about practices before any 
information is collected; and how and what data are stored 
about a user” [EAA03]. This demonstrates the difference 
between what policies address and what users are looking 
for.   
Such discrepancies are of course to be expected. The 
organizations responsible for these websites need to satisfy 
their legal requirements, and users’ concerns may shift over 
time. It is important, however, to note that users have 
different information needs, and seek to satisfy them.  
Lack of Transparency 
In the Harris user survey, a small group (5%) gave the 
following as their primary justification for not reading 
policies: “Do not believe the policies will protect my 
privacy” [PLI01].  Although uncommon, this sentiment 
reflects a powerful, and possibly growing skepticism. 
Though connected with the issue of focus, this also 
addresses the issue of transparency. 
Users of a website are given a policy to read, in essence a 
list of promises and disclosures about how their 
information will be used and treated. What takes place 
behind the scenes is hidden from the user, and so it is a 
daunting task to determine whether a site abides by its own 
policy. Companies know and users both know this. It is 
therefore not surprising that some users mistrust the 
validity of policies. The burden placed on the user to verify 
a site’s compliance with its policy is even greater than the 
burden of reviewing each policy. 
This is not to say that when serious policy violations are 
detected, investigation, punitive action, or damage to 
reputation necessarily follows. Some examples where 
negative consequences ensued include FTC vs. Toysmart 
[FTC00], FTC vs. Eli Lilly [FTC02a], or FTC vs. 
Microsoft [FTC02b]. But countless policy violations go 
unpunished (for instance the Microsoft FTP server leak of 
November 2002 [Ley02], or the 2002 Hotmail violation 
[Hal02]). For users to take privacy policies seriously, they 
need to be given verifiable guarantees, or more insight into 
how their information is used. 
P3P Policies 
Efforts to address the problems of undue burden and 
implicit consent have in part led to the development of 
P3P6, an alternative approach to today’s policies. P3P, in 
essence, provides a mechanism for encoding policies in a 
machine-readable form. This makes it possible to develop 
automated policy analysis tools and user agents [CLM02]; 
this reduces the burden that users face when checking 
policies by allowing for automation. In answer to the 
problem of implicit consent, P3P defines “safe-zones”, 
designated areas for posting policies, areas that can be 
accessed without implying consent for the user. P3P also 
introduces other desirable features, such as binding the data 
collected to the policy under which it was collected. This 
forces providers to respect and abide by the agreement that 
was made at collection time, and collect new consent 
whenever a policy changes.  
Approaches such as P3P are an important step towards 
making policies usable, but not perfect. Adoption has been 
slow, and much debate still rages on the suitability of P3P 
in protecing users privacy. The European Union has 
rejected P3P as a viable technical means for supporting 
their privacy laws [Epi00]. Others have argued  that P3P 
fails to comply with baseline standards for privacy 
protection and is a complex/confusing protocol that hinders 
Internet users in protecting their privacy [Epi00]. Little 
evidence supports industry’s claim that P3P improves user 
privacy, and it does not assess compliance with the five 
FIPs [FIP73].   
Realizing Informed Consent 
Ultimately, privacy is a highly subjective matter. 
Boundaries and sensitivities are not only culturally 
determined, but also highly individualized. What is 
acceptable and unacceptable must therefore ultimately be a 
decision that the affected person must make. 
Awareness 
The first element of informed consent must by necessity be 
to ensure users are actually informed of what is taking 
place. If users are to give consent, they need to be able to 
effectively evaluate the risks and benefits of any 
transaction. The problem is that we not only have a 
mismatch between what sites and users are concerned 
about in terms of privacy, but also a huge gap in 
vocabulary.  
Policies refer to things such as cookies, web-bugs and 
ActiveX controls. Users are not concerned about 
technological details; they are interested in knowing what 
the consequences of their actions will be. It is as 
unreasonable to expect users to know what the risks 
associated with cookies are as it is to expect them to find 
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and remember websites by their IP numbers alone. It is our 
job to bridge this gap, to make privacy accessible to the 
general public, to translate risk assessments and 
technological vulnerabilities into terms that users can 
understand. 
Trust and transparency are also key elements to realizing 
informed consent. When selecting a provider, or deciding 
whether to disclose information, users must determine 
whether a provider will act in a manner consistent with 
their wishes and whether the provider will live up to their 
promises. In effect, users conduct a cost-benefit analysis of: 
the information disclosed, how sensitive it is to the user, 
and the (perceived) risk for misuse. This is weighted 
against the transaction’s potential benefit. If an individual 
does not trust a provider to behave in an appropriate 
manner, no transaction will follow unless the individual is 
somehow forced, or the stakes are low [Kol98]. We must 
seek to develop certification schemes for policies, and 
promote transparency in applications, giving users a chance 
to confirm policy compliance for themselves. 
History 
Information disclosures often occur over time, information 
processing, or new features or services lead to a need for 
added information. To the user, this is a particularly 
dangerous practice. When faced with such a request for 
information, it is difficult for users to evaluate how it will 
interact with previously disclosed information, and what 
this aggregate may reveal about them. Sometimes this 
strategy is employed on purpose to confuse the user; we 
refer to this practice as “information creep”. If users are to 
make an informed decision, full disclosure of already 
known information is needed. If the provider does not 
provide this, then the user should have the ability to access 
such information. 
Finally, privacy protection begins at home. Users need to 
be aware of how much information they disclose about 
themselves (intentionally as well as unintentionally). If 
users are uninformed and do not protect themselves against 
unreasonable disclosures or terms of use, then there is little 
any system can do to help them. The most important thing 
that can be done is to try to educate users about how their 
practices affect them, support a process of self-reflection, 
and inform them about the tools at their disposal to better 
protect their privacy. 
Control  
A main deterrent to users managing their privacy is the 
burden it currently presents. Companies only have to define 
a single policy to cover all their activities, but users are 
expected to review the policy of every company with 
which they interact. Faced with such an overwhelming 
burden, most users quickly give up, or develop different 
shortcut techniques to minimize the burden. There are 
numerous tools that allow users to filter or warn users 
about practices, mostly based around P3P (e.g. Microsoft’s 
Internet Explorer 67 and AT&T’s Privacy Bird8).  
These tools are typically based on one of two principles: 
linear privacy preferences or the techno-centric selection. 
The principle of the linear privacy preference assumes that 
privacy concerns can be defined on a discrete, 
monotonically increasing scale of risks, or compromises. 
While greatly simplifying the task for the users, this 
approach tries to force fit the users own privacy 
preferences and concerns into defined categories, limiting 
their options.  The techno-centric approach asks the user to 
know the limitations and risks associated with different 
technologies, asking for their preferences to each of them.   
Using scenarios, and use/misuse cases, leveraging their 
conceptual models, the user can be engaged using 
terminology that they understand. This methodology would 
enable us to obtain a set of performance driven 
requirements from users, as well as a rule-set detailing 
what tradeoffs and risks they are willing to accept. This 
rule-set may then be compared to website privacy policies 




Our main focus as we go forward will be to look at ways to 
provide users with better tools for protecting their privacy. 
Key to this is making sure the user is informed about what 
risks they are exposing themselves to, what information 
they are disclosing, and how that information has been 
shared with others. We are working on a set of end-user 
tools to empower users to take a more active and 
meaningful role in protecting their own privacy online. 
These include awareness tools, history tools, and control 
tools aimed at reducing the burden placed on end users. 
Other possible avenues of research include continuing our 
data collection, looking at how policies are actually used to 
complement and contrast against the survey data. We also 
wish to re-examine these policies to see how they have 
changed since this survey was done. Are policies becoming 
more readable, more user friendly as the market and the 
practice matures? It would also be interesting to compare 
our results to those of a random sample of sites to 
determine how representative our findings are.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The practice of privacy policies as it stands today is an 
ineffective way to protect users privacy online. Most users 
rarely consult privacy policies, and when they do they 
often find them unintelligible. As the Internet has moved 
away from being the exclusive domain of academics and 
researchers, more vulnerable populations have grown 
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significantly. This trend will continue, as the differences 
between the Internet population and the general population 
continue to equalize. It will therefore be continually 
important to ensure that policies are clear and readable. 
As the practice stands today, having a privacy policy linked 
to a site, or displaying a privacy seal, may have more of a 
negative than a positive effect on users. Because they are 
unlikely to follow these links and determine what the 
policy says, or what the seal stands for, they may make the 
wrong assumptions. The simple fact that a site has a policy 
or a seal does not mean they protect users privacy more 
than a site without, though users may make that asumption. 
There is a clear and definitive need for tools to support and 
empower the user to take charge of their privacy online. 
Without such tools the task is proving to daunting and 
confusing, putting many users at risk of privacy violations. 
We in the HCI community are faced with a tremendous 
challenge in making privacy protection accessible to the 
end-user, and an opportunity to do something that will 
greatly benefit many. 
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